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Record STMT-WDB8CD9Advisory

Regarding the Issue of the Essence of Legal Treatment and the Possibility of Granting Legal Status to a Robot in Civil Law

Position paper State lawGlobalunknown

This academic chapter examines the legal treatment of robots in civil law and evaluates the possibility of granting them legal status as subjects of law. The authors conclude that while robots possess certain characteristics of legal subjects, they cannot be granted independent legal personality because they lack free will and the ability to express mental attitudes towards their actions. Consequently, robots should be treated as objects of law whose actions are defined by their human owners.

Summary and content fields are drawn from the document text and are pending editorial review.

Who issued it

SpringerIndustry
Publisher
I.T. Trubilin Kuban State Agricultural UniversityAcademic
Contributor
North-Caucasus Branch of the Federal State Budgetary Educational Institution of Higher Education “Russian State University of Justice”Academic
Contributor
Volgograd State UniversityAcademic
Contributor
Legal forceAdvisory
Under whose authorityState law
Judged fromfull text

Who it governs

Researchers and academicsGeneral publicLegislatorsRegulators

Researchers and legal scholars studying the intersection of robotics, artificial intelligence, and civil law.

Sectors
Research and science · legal research and roboticsJustice · civil law and legal status

What the document contains

What's covered

The text explores the legal nature of robots within civil circulation, comparing them to legal persons and analyzing whether they can hold rights and duties as independent legal subjects.

What's missing

The text does not provide binding regulatory rules, enforcement mechanisms, or legislative drafts.

Key takeaways
  • Robots are essentially technical devices and should be viewed as objects of law with specific technical specifications.
  • Although robots can carry out physical acts independently, they lack their own free will and cannot express mental attitudes towards their actions.
  • Robots cannot be recognized as independent subjects of law based on comparisons with legal persons.
  • The actions of robots are always defined by their human owners, who possess legal capacity, active capacity, and delictual dispositive capacity.
Outline
Not stated
Issued16 May 2019
Length1,263 words
FormatNot recorded
Scopeglobal

How it scores

Pending review

Each score is backed by a quote verified against the document text. Editorial review has not yet confirmed them.

Accountability

3/5

Clear responsibility for AI outcomes

But despite that fact robots cannot be recognized as independent subjects of law, as their actions are always defined by their human owners who actually possess legal capacity

Abstract

screening score · 2026-10-24

Fairness

0/5

Non-discrimination and equitable treatment

Abstract

screening score · 2026-10-24

Human Dignity

0/5

Respect for the inherent worth of persons

Abstract

screening score · 2026-10-24

Human Oversight

0/5

Humans remain in control of consequential decisions

Abstract

screening score · 2026-10-24

Privacy

0/5

Protection of personal data and private life

Abstract

screening score · 2026-10-24

Transparency

0/5

Openness about how AI systems work and are used

Abstract

screening score · 2026-10-24

Enforcement

0/5

Consequences and compliance mechanisms with real force

Abstract

screening score · 2026-10-24

Impact Assessment

0/5

Required assessment of an AI system's risks/impacts before or during use

Abstract

screening score · 2026-10-24

Topics

robot_legal_status civil_law legal_personality artificial_intelligence property_relations