How to Use Virtue Ethics for Thinking About the Moral Standing of Social Robots: A Relational Interpretation in Terms of Practices, Habits, and Performance
This academic paper examines the moral standing of social robots through the lens of a relational, embodied, and performance-oriented interpretation of virtue ethics. Drawing on the works of MacIntyre and Bourdieu, the author argues that abusive behaviors toward social robots are ethically problematic because they reflect and shape the moral character and habits of humans within a wider social-practical context. The paper concludes that evaluating human-robot interactions requires examining social practices, bodily performances, and habituation rather than solely focusing on the intrinsic properties of robots.
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Who issued it
Who it governs
This paper is for researchers, philosophers, and human-robot interaction practitioners interested in the ethical, social, and theoretical implications of social robotics.
What the document contains
The document addresses the moral standing of social robots through a virtue ethics framework, critiquing individualistic approaches and proposing a relational, embodied, and performance-oriented interpretation using the ideas of MacIntyre and Bourdieu.
The paper does not provide empirical studies on human-robot interaction or formal legal regulations for robot manufacturing and use.
- Robots lack intrinsic properties granting them direct moral standing, meaning any wrongness in abusing them must be grounded in the human agent.
- A virtue ethics approach explains that abusing social robots damages the moral character of the human agent by cultivating vice.
- Virtue and vice should not be viewed merely as individual mental states, but must be understood as socially embedded within wider human practices and traditions.
- Inorporating Bourdieu's concept of habit allows virtue ethics to account for the bodily, temporal, and performative dimensions of human interactions with technology.
- The social environment and underlying structures of power choreograph human habits and behaviors, making both vice and virtue socially shaped phenomena.
· Abstract · 1 Introduction · 2 Are Social Robots Kantian Dogs? Using Virtue Ethics for Thinking About Moral Standing · 3 A More Relational Interpretation and Application of Virtue Theory: Using MacIntyre to Frame (Ab)use of Robots as Embedded in Practices · 4 The Incorporation of Virtue Via Habits and the Performance of Virtue: Using Bourdieu to Conceptualize the Temporal and Embodiment Dimension of the (Ab)use of Robots · 5 Further Discussion · 6 Conclusion: Towards a More Relational and Comprehensive Virtue Ethics of Technology
How it scores
Each score is backed by a quote verified against the document text. Editorial review has not yet confirmed them.
Accountability
0/5Clear responsibility for AI outcomes
N/A
screening score · 2026-10-24
Fairness
0/5Non-discrimination and equitable treatment
N/A
screening score · 2026-10-24
Human Dignity
1/5Respect for the inherent worth of persons
with regard to what is due to the robot. The robot does not feel pain, is not conscious
1 Introduction
screening score · 2026-10-24
Human Oversight
0/5Humans remain in control of consequential decisions
N/A
screening score · 2026-10-24
Privacy
0/5Protection of personal data and private life
N/A
screening score · 2026-10-24
Transparency
0/5Openness about how AI systems work and are used
N/A
screening score · 2026-10-24
Enforcement
0/5Consequences and compliance mechanisms with real force
N/A
screening score · 2026-10-24
Impact Assessment
0/5Required assessment of an AI system's risks/impacts before or during use
N/A
screening score · 2026-10-24