The other question: can and should robots have rights?
This academic paper investigates the philosophical question of whether social robots can and should have rights, examining the is-ought problem and four existing modalities in robot ethics. It evaluates instrumentalist, property-based, and sentiment-based approaches to machine moral status, and proposes an alternative relational framework influenced by Emmanuel Levinas. The author argues for a reorientation of moral patiency that resists anthropocentrism and keeps ethical consideration permanently open to others.
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Who issued it
Who it governs
Researchers and scholars in robot ethics and philosophy of technology who want to critically examine the conceptual frameworks underlying machine moral status and rights.
What the document contains
The paper addresses the philosophical foundations of machine moral patiency, analyzes four logical modalities concerning social robots and rights, and explores a Levinasian relational alternative to traditional agent-centered robot ethics.
The text does not provide specific legal frameworks, concrete regulatory enforcement mechanisms, or formal policy recommendations for governing robots.
- Robot ethics has predominantly focused on agent-oriented questions rather than machine moral patiency.
- The question of whether robots can and should have rights invokes Hume's is-ought problem, dividing ontological capabilities from axiological obligations.
- Current literature offers four distinct modalities regarding robot rights by affirming or denying the is and ought statements.
- Instrumentalist and property-based approaches face significant terminological, epistemological, and practical limitations.
- Drawing on Emmanuel Levinas, an alternative relational approach places ethics before ontology and treats moral standing as emerging from social interactions rather than intrinsic properties.
· Introduction · The is/ought problem · Modalities of robots rights - !S1 !S2 - S1 S2 - S1 !S2 - !S1 S2 · Thinking otherwise · Conclusions
How it scores
Each score is backed by a quote verified against the document text. Editorial review has not yet confirmed them.
Fairness
0/5Non-discrimination and equitable treatment
N/A
screening score · 2026-10-24
Human Dignity
0/5Respect for the inherent worth of persons
N/A
screening score · 2026-10-24
Human Oversight
0/5Humans remain in control of consequential decisions
N/A
screening score · 2026-10-24
Privacy
0/5Protection of personal data and private life
N/A
screening score · 2026-10-24
Transparency
0/5Openness about how AI systems work and are used
N/A
screening score · 2026-10-24
Enforcement
0/5Consequences and compliance mechanisms with real force
N/A
screening score · 2026-10-24
Impact Assessment
0/5Required assessment of an AI system's risks/impacts before or during use
N/A
screening score · 2026-10-24