Editorial: Should Robots Have Standing? The Moral and Legal Status of Social Robots
This editorial introduces a research collection examining the moral and legal status of social robots and AI systems. It maps various approaches including legal standing, public opinion, suffering-based status, and relational ethics. The text serves as an overview to facilitate debate rather than advance a single definitive solution.
Summary and content fields are drawn from the document text and are pending editorial review.
Who issued it
Who it governs
Researchers, theorists, and practitioners interested in the intersection of AI, robotics, ethics, and law.
What the document contains
The document covers various philosophical, legal, and empirical perspectives on whether social robots and AI should be granted moral status or legal standing. It explores topics such as legal personhood, public opinion surveys on robot rights, suffering-based benchmarks, and relational ethics.
The document is an academic editorial and research topic introduction, so it does not contain binding regulations, enforcement mechanisms, or definitive policy directives.
- The question of whether social robots and AI should have moral or legal standing is an increasingly timely and debated topic.
- Various legal frameworks are proposed, ranging from 'electronic persons' and gradient legal personhood to alternative statuses inspired by historical laws.
- Empirical studies on public opinion show that most surveyed individuals are currently hesitant to grant legal rights or personhood to sentient AI.
- While traditional status relies on internal properties like sentience, relational ethics suggests that standing can emerge from human-robot social interactions.
- The collection aims to map the range of possible approaches rather than promote one definitive solution.
· STANDING AND LEGAL PERSONALITY · PUBLIC OPINION AND PERCEPTION · SUFFERING AND MORAL/LEGAL STATUS · RELATIONAL ETHICS
How it scores
Each score is backed by a quote verified against the document text. Editorial review has not yet confirmed them.
Accountability
3/5Clear responsibility for AI outcomes
To address this, Gogoshin proposes alternative accountability structures that can accommodate these other forms of moral agency.
RELATIONAL ETHICS
screening score · 2026-10-23
Fairness
0/5Non-discrimination and equitable treatment
N/A
screening score · 2026-10-23
Human Dignity
0/5Respect for the inherent worth of persons
N/A
screening score · 2026-10-23
Human Oversight
0/5Humans remain in control of consequential decisions
N/A
screening score · 2026-10-23
Privacy
0/5Protection of personal data and private life
N/A
screening score · 2026-10-23
Transparency
0/5Openness about how AI systems work and are used
N/A
screening score · 2026-10-23
Enforcement
0/5Consequences and compliance mechanisms with real force
N/A
screening score · 2026-10-23
Impact Assessment
2/5Required assessment of an AI system's risks/impacts before or during use
Brazilian jurist Avila Negri performs a cost/benefit analysis of legal proposals like that introduced by the European Parliament.
STANDING AND LEGAL PERSONALITY
screening score · 2026-10-23