Examining ethical challenges in human–robot interaction using a Levinasian framework
This paper develops a Levinasian framework to address ethical challenges and responsibility attribution in human-robot interaction (HRI). Drawing on Emmanuel Levinas, Jacques Derrida, and object-oriented ontology, the author argues that infinite, asymmetrical responsibility to the Other offers a more productive lens than ethical pluralism for diagnosing vulnerabilities in socio-technical networks. The framework is grounded in concrete domains including healthcare robotics, autonomous vehicles, and algorithmic governance.
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Who issued it
Who it governs
Researchers and scholars in AI ethics, robotics, law, and philosophy seeking a posthuman jurisprudence and Levinasian critique of human-robot governance.
What the document contains
The paper addresses the philosophical, ethical, and legal challenges of human-robot interaction through relational turns, analyzing distributed responsibility, the limitations of anthropocentric language, and the intersection of ethics and law using Levinasian and deconstructive frameworks.
It does not provide a comprehensive doctrinal legal analysis of any single national jurisdiction or an empirical dataset of HRI incidents.
- The relational turns in human-robot interaction shift focus from static ontological status to dynamic relational contexts and socio-technical systems of subjugation.
- A Levinasian framework grounded in infinite, asymmetrical responsibility offers a critical alternative to conventional ethical pluralism in technology ethics.
- Legal norms and technical vocabularies in HRI must remain revisable and open to interruption by the primordial ethical obligation to the vulnerable Other.
- Concrete domains such as healthcare robotics, autonomous vehicles, and algorithmic governance demonstrate how distributed agency complicates traditional responsibility attribution.
1 Introduction 1.1 Relational turn no. 1: from ontology to epistemology 1.2 Relational turn no. 2: robots as instruments of subjugation 1.3 Problem C: language, justice, and law 1.4 Problem C in HRI practice 1.5 Levinasian responsibility, obligations, and ethical pluralism 2 Conclusion
How it scores
Each score is backed by a quote verified against the document text. Editorial review has not yet confirmed them.
Accountability
3/5Clear responsibility for AI outcomes
responsibility is shared across designers, corporations, regulators, and users, but not diluted to the point of vanishing
1.5 Levinasian responsibility, obligations, and ethical pluralism
screening score · 2026-10-24
Fairness
2/5Non-discrimination and equitable treatment
enforcing societal divisions along lines of race, class, and nationality. The automation of decision-making in these contexts not only obscures human accountability but also entrenches systemic biases
1.2 Relational turn no. 2: robots as instruments of subjugation
screening score · 2026-10-24
Human Oversight
2/5Humans remain in control of consequential decisions
Even when human oversight is formally retained—an officer can overrule the system, a caseworker can override a recommendation—the human decision is framed as deviating from or correcting a default of computational objectivity.
1.4 Problem C in HRI practice
screening score · 2026-10-24
Privacy
0/5Protection of personal data and private life
N/A
screening score · 2026-10-24
Transparency
2/5Openness about how AI systems work and are used
Mechanisms such as mandatory transparency reports, algorithmic audits, and whistleblower protections can be interpreted as juridical ways of making visible
1.5 Levinasian responsibility, obligations, and ethical pluralism
screening score · 2026-10-24
Enforcement
0/5Consequences and compliance mechanisms with real force
N/A
screening score · 2026-10-24
Impact Assessment
4/5Required assessment of an AI system's risks/impacts before or during use
Ethical review boards, public consultations, and impact assessments can then be understood as imperfect but necessary spaces
1.5 Levinasian responsibility, obligations, and ethical pluralism
screening score · 2026-10-24