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Record STMT-WC2CE1DLegally binding

Legal personality of robots, corporations, idols and chimpanzees: a quest for legitimacy

Position paper State lawGlobaladopted

This academic article examines proposals to grant robots legal personality with the aim of exonerating creators and users from liability. It analyzes the attributes of legal personhood and the justifications for separate personality in corporations and idols, while also examining the refusal of legal personality for animals. The author concludes that robots are ineligible to be recognized as legal persons based on established requirements of personhood.

Summary and content fields are drawn from the document text and are pending editorial review.

Who issued it

SpringerIndustry
Publisher
Legal forceLegally binding
Under whose authorityState law
Judged fromfull text

Who it governs

Researchers and academicsLegislatorsRegulators

Legal scholars and policymakers seeking a jurisprudential analysis of robot liability and legal personhood.

Sectors
Research and science · legal research and jurisprudence

What the document contains

What's covered

The article addresses the legal liability of industrial robots, the concept of legal personality for non-human entities like corporations and idols, and why robots fail to meet the criteria for legal personhood.

What's missing

The text does not provide operational frameworks or technical safety standards for deploying collaborative robots in manufacturing environments.

Key takeaways
  • Proposals to grant robots legal personality aim primarily to exonerate creators and users from liability.
  • Industrial robots are currently regarded as products rather than legal persons.
  • An analysis of corporations and idols shows distinct justifications for separate legal personhood that do not apply to robots.
  • Animals are generally refused legal personality, reinforcing strict criteria for personhood.
  • Robots are ineligible to be legal persons based on the requirements of personhood.
Issued14 November 2016
Length2,767 words
FormatNot recorded
Scopeglobal

How it scores

Pending review

Each score is backed by a quote verified against the document text. Editorial review has not yet confirmed them.

Accountability

3/5

Clear responsibility for AI outcomes

Industrial robots are presently regarded as products for liability purposes. In contrast, some commentators have proposed that robots be granted legal personality, with an overarching aim of exonerating the respective creators and users of these artefacts from liability.

Abstract

screening score · 2026-10-24

Fairness

0/5

Non-discrimination and equitable treatment

screening score · 2026-10-24

Human Dignity

0/5

Respect for the inherent worth of persons

screening score · 2026-10-24

Human Oversight

0/5

Humans remain in control of consequential decisions

screening score · 2026-10-24

Privacy

0/5

Protection of personal data and private life

screening score · 2026-10-24

Transparency

0/5

Openness about how AI systems work and are used

screening score · 2026-10-24

Enforcement

3/5

Consequences and compliance mechanisms with real force

See more than 50 sections listed in s1317E on civil penalty and Schedule 3 containing 346 sections on criminal liability of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), Australia.

Notes

screening score · 2026-10-24

Impact Assessment

0/5

Required assessment of an AI system's risks/impacts before or during use

screening score · 2026-10-24

Topics

legal_personality robot_liability corporate_personhood artificial_intelligence jurisprudence