How a non-conscious robot could be an agent with capacity for morally responsible behaviour
This academic article defends an internalist and event-causal libertarian view of free will and responsibility, arguing that advanced non-conscious robots can possess a genuine capacity for moral responsibility despite lacking phenomenal consciousness. By combining a developmental self-theory with a consequentialist framework of holding agents responsible, the author outlines how machines can learn from feedback and alter their behavior autonomously over time. Finally, the paper addresses common objections regarding design history, responsibility gaps, and self-modification capabilities in autonomous systems.
Summary and content fields are drawn from the document text and are pending editorial review.
Who issued it
Who it governs
Researchers and ethicists studying AI safety, moral agency, and the philosophical implications of machine consciousness and robot accountability.
What the document contains
The article examines the philosophical foundations of free will and moral responsibility, applying an event-causal libertarian and revisionist framework to demonstrate how non-conscious robots can act as moral agents. It evaluates Russell and Norvig's agent architectures alongside neuroscientific insights on decision-making to argue that machines can learn from feedback, develop autobiographical-like memory structures, and be held accountable via corrective mechanisms.
The text does not provide specific legal regulations, industry compliance standards, or concrete technical specifications for engineering moral AI systems.
- Non-conscious robots can possess a degree of free will and moral responsibility through event-causal learning processes.
- Event-causal libertarianism serves as a middle position combining compatibilist causal mind views with libertarian indeterminism.
- Responsibility functions as a practice of influencing an agent's deliberation processes through praise and blame.
- Robots can be held responsible in a non-conscious manner by responding to negative and positive feedback mechanisms.
- The absence of phenomenal consciousness means robots lack subjective understanding, but physical causal processes can still drive moral behavior.
1 Introduction 2 An event-causal libertarian theory of free will and responsibility 3 How could a robot be an agent with capacity for morally responsible behaviour? 4 Objections 5 Conclusion
How it scores
Each score is backed by a quote verified against the document text. Editorial review has not yet confirmed them.
Accountability
3/5Clear responsibility for AI outcomes
This article defends a standardist view in the sense that the internal states are what matters for determining the moral agency of the robot, but it will be unique in being an internalist theory defending a large degree of robot responsibility
Abstract
screening score · 2026-10-24
Fairness
0/5Non-discrimination and equitable treatment
N/A
screening score · 2026-10-24
Human Dignity
0/5Respect for the inherent worth of persons
N/A
screening score · 2026-10-24
Human Oversight
0/5Humans remain in control of consequential decisions
N/A
screening score · 2026-10-24
Privacy
0/5Protection of personal data and private life
N/A
screening score · 2026-10-24
Transparency
0/5Openness about how AI systems work and are used
N/A
screening score · 2026-10-24
Enforcement
0/5Consequences and compliance mechanisms with real force
N/A
screening score · 2026-10-24
Impact Assessment
0/5Required assessment of an AI system's risks/impacts before or during use
N/A
screening score · 2026-10-24