Social Assistive Robots in Healthcare: Ethical Boundaries of Caritative Caring Perspective
This academic article examines the ethical boundaries of introducing social assistive robots into healthcare through the lens of Katie Eriksson's theory of caritative caring. The authors argue that while robots can support routine tasks, safety, and autonomy, they lack the moral agency and compassionate intentionality required for true caritative caring. Therefore, robots should complement rather than replace human caregivers and relational care.
Summary and content fields are drawn from the document text and are pending editorial review.
Who issued it
Who it governs
Healthcare professionals, researchers, and AI developers seeking an ethical framework for integrating social robots into care practices without compromising human compassion.
What the document contains
The paper examines the ethical implications and boundaries of using social assistive robots in healthcare through Katie Eriksson's caritative caring theory. It evaluates how technological capabilities align with ethical categories such as human dignity, the care relationship, responsibility, and ethical freedom.
The text does not provide concrete technical safety standards, legal regulations, or empirical trial data regarding specific robotic hardware.
- Caritative caring is grounded in Caritas, human dignity, and relational presence, which robots cannot inherently possess.
- Social assistive robots can simulate social behaviors and assist with routine tasks, safety, and autonomy.
- Robots lack moral agency, compassionate intentionality, and ethical freedom, meaning they cannot participate in caritative caring in the full sense.
- The role of social assistive robots in healthcare must be supportive and complementary rather than substitutive.
- Human caregivers, designers, and institutions retain ultimate moral responsibility for care practices involving technology.
· Introduction · Theoretical Background: Caring as a Caritative Phenomenon · Social Assistive Robots in Relation to the Ethical Categories of Caritative Caring · Delimiting the Role of Social Assistive Robots in Caritative Caring · Conclusion
How it scores
Each score is backed by a quote verified against the document text. Editorial review has not yet confirmed them.
Accountability
2/5Clear responsibility for AI outcomes
For this reason, responsibility for care practices involving social assistive robots ultimately remains with human caregivers, designers, and institutions
3.3 Responsibility, Virtue, Obligation and Duty
screening score · 2026-10-24
Fairness
0/5Non-discrimination and equitable treatment
N/A
screening score · 2026-10-24
Human Dignity
3/5Respect for the inherent worth of persons
Human dignity constitutes the ethical core of caritative caring and refers to the intrinsic and inviolable worth of the person, independent of functional ability or health status.
3.1 Human Dignity
screening score · 2026-10-24
Human Oversight
3/5Humans remain in control of consequential decisions
Caritative caring theory thus supports a model in which robots enhance, rather than replace, human caregiving.
4 Delimiting the Role of Social Assistive Robots in Caritative Caring
screening score · 2026-10-24
Privacy
1/5Protection of personal data and private life
Concerns related to privacy, security, and data protection have also been highlighted
1 Introduction
screening score · 2026-10-24
Transparency
0/5Openness about how AI systems work and are used
N/A
screening score · 2026-10-24
Enforcement
0/5Consequences and compliance mechanisms with real force
N/A
screening score · 2026-10-24
Impact Assessment
0/5Required assessment of an AI system's risks/impacts before or during use
N/A
screening score · 2026-10-24